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Narcissism, Nationalism and Philosophy in Heidegger 
 





This paper contrasts the notion of “willing” in Heidegger’s politics with the notion of “dawning” 
in Heidegger’s philosophy. It argues that, in the political text, the attunement of Dasein to what-is 
is centred in the notion of Dasein’s “willing” of what-is, while in the philosophical text it is 
centred in the notion of what-is “dawning” on Dasein. It maintains that the attitude to anxiety 
essential to a “dawning” of what-is is not reached in Heidegger’s “The Self-Assertion of the 
German University”. It concludes by maintaining that, rather than being attuned to what-is, the 
will in the “The Self-Assertion of the German University” is attuned to its own relationship to 
what is in a narcissistic rather than a philosophical way; that is, it territorializes “dawning” as a 
relation to “what is”, and makes “dawning” of “what-is” its “own” in the same way as any 
nationalism makes a culture, a language or a geographical region its own. In contrast to the 
narcissism of nationalism, philosophy, as outlined by Heidegger in the essay “What Is 
Metaphysics?”, is the experience of allowing what-is to “dawn” on Dasein rather than a 




This paper will show that the relationship between 
Dasein and what-is in the text What Is Metaphysics? 
(hereafter referred to as “the Essay”) is fundamentally 
different from the relationship between these same 
two terms in Heidegger’s Rectorial Address entitled 
The Self-Assertion of the German University (1985) 
(hereafter referred to as “the Address”). Whereas in 
the Essay a resolute attunement to “what-is” is said to 
“dawn” (1948, p. 347) on - or, in the German original, 
“uber uns kommen” (1955, p. 41) - Dasein, in the 
context of the Address the German is called upon to 
“will” (1985, p. 479) a resolute relationship to “what-
is”. The difference between “dawning” (“uber uns 
kommen”) and “willing” is, as I will maintain, a basis 
for conceptualising a difference between Heidegger’s 
philosophy and his politics. Allowing what-is to dawn 
on us through being overcome by the strangeness of 
what is, is the basis of philosophy as an attunement to 
what is.  
 
My choice of texts is guided by the writing of 
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe (1989, p. 271), who 
maintains that the Essay is recognised as a 
philosophical text and the Address is recognised as a 
political text, a text in which Heidegger outlines his 
proposals for the development of the mission of the 
German university in the context of the emergence of 
National Socialism. As Lacoue-Labarthe points out, 
the Rectorial Address is also one of the political texts 
that Heidegger never disavowed (1989, p. 271). 
 
Having shown that the relationship between Dasein 
and what-is as used in the Address is different from 
the self-same relationship as it occurs in the Essay, I 
will “deconstruct” the relationship as it occurs in the 
Address. My “deconstruction” will take place in 
terms of the language of Heidegger’s hermeneutic 
phenomenology as developed in Being and Time. 
Using the latter language, I will demonstrate that, 
whereas in the Essay Dasein is called upon to be 
attuned to what-is, in the Address the German people 
are called upon to be attuned to their attunement to 
what is. Furthermore, in the Address the attunement 
to the attunement to what-is takes on a particular 
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form. It is, as Heidegger reiterates in the Address, an 
attunement in which the German is called upon to 
will attunement to what-is. In the Address, rather than 
being reflexively “attuned” to what-is, the German is 
called to will his or her form of “attunement” to what-
is.  
 
If, as is outlined the Essay, we take an attunement to 
what-is as the key characteristic of metaphysics or 
philosophy, then the focus of the Address is a call to 
the German people to will themselves to become the 
philosophical or the metaphysical people. For the 
willing of the attunement to what-is, is the will to be 
the philosophical people. It is this characteristic of 
willing itself into being the philosophical people that 
makes the form of summonsing in the Address 
nationalistic and narcissistic. For, as Isaiah Berlin has 
shown, a characteristic of nationalism is a care not so 
much for the land, language, culture or religion, but 
for the fact that it is “our” language, culture, religion 
or land (1979, p. 342). Amplifying this point, Ernst 
Gellner points out that, in nationalism, we are 
concerned with willing “ourselves” through the 
language, religion, culture or land that we are already 
alienated from (1983, pp. 57-58). Instead of caring for 
the land, language or culture, we come to care for 
preserving and protecting our way of caring for the 
land, language and culture. In nationalism we care for 
the way in which the land reflects us back to 
ourselves, giving us our sense of identity and 
belonging, finding purpose in striving after ourselves 
- in willing ourselves into being. 
 
In these terms, Heidegger’s concern in the Address is 
with the way in which, under conditions of alienation 
from themselves, philosophy acts as a mirror through 
which the German people can identify themselves and 
take pride in themselves. In the Address, he 
articulates the “our” relationship of the German 
people to philosophy. Just as a nationalist is 
preoccupied with a culture as being “ours”, so 
Heidegger, in the Address, is preoccupied with 
philosophy as being “ours”, i.e., with the “German-
ness” of philosophy. There is, in the Address, a shift 
away from unpacking the dimensions of philosophical 
attunement as such, to a preoccupation with a nation 
who, existentially lost, need to find their identity by 
naming themselves as the caretakers of philosophy. 
Philosophy becomes a means to an end; a means by 
which the German people are mirrored back to 
themselves and a means by which they can bring 
themselves into being. 
 
This is the clue which suggests that the Address is a 
narcissistic discourse. Narcissism is a preoccupation, 
under conditions of estrangement, with the mirrored 
self or nation. It is the will to hold onto the way in 
which the self is mirrored through an other being.  In 
narcissism I am interested in the other to the extent 
that the other reflects me back to myself. I hold onto 
the way the other mirrors me. I attempt to become the 
mirrored self, but I will always fail. For the mirrored 
self is nothing more than an image. In the Address, 
Heidegger is calling on the German people to will 
their mirrored self. They are called upon to will their 
German will - their German attunement to what-is. It 
is not “what-is” as such that needs to be tended to, but 
the image of the German people that is reflected in 
the mirror of being attuned to “what is” that is 
attended to. The Germans need to hold onto 
philosophy - need to will themselves as a 
philosophical people because it reflects them back to 
themselves. 
 
In contrast to the politics of the Address, in his 
philosophy, as outlined in the Essay, Heidegger is not 
attuned to summonsing the Germans to will their own 
way of being attuned to the world. That it is the 
Germans - or any particular people - who are attuned 
to what is, is not even a theme of discussion in the 
philosophical text. In the Essay, Heidegger is 
concerned with describing the attunement of Dasein 
to what is, rather than with the identity of the people 
who are attuned to what-is. In the Essay, he is not 
concerned with a people appropriating “dawning” or 
“disclosure” or “unconcealment” as “our” - a nation’s 
- attunement. The difference between a dawning or 
emergent attunement to what-is and an appropriation 
of “dawning” as a form of attunement is the 
articulation of the difference between Heidegger’s 
politics and philosophy in strictly hermeneutic 
phenomenological terms. Philosophical “attunement” 
is an emergent “attunement” to what-is, whereas the 
political “attunement” is characterised by a possessive 
attunement of “dawning” and the experience of 
“unconcealment”. 
 
In the Essay, “dawning”, as the basis of attunement to 
what-is, is made possible by a resolute (entschlossen- 
heit) dwelling in anxiety - not by willing ourselves 
out of anxiety, but by allowing ourselves to be “struck 
dumb” (1948, p. 336) by dread. By being struck dumb 
by anxiety, Dasein is overcome by the strangeness of 
what-is and, by embracing the strangeness of what-is, 
Dasein finds itself in the midst of asking the question 
of what is. In the German original this is expressed as 
follows: “Einzig weil das Nichts im Grunde des 
Daseins offenbar ist, kann die volle Befremdlichkeit 
des Deinden uber uns kommen. Nur wenn dei 
Befremdlichkeit des Seiended uns bedrangt, weckt es 
und zieht es auf sich die Verwundering. Nur auf dem 
Grunde der Verwundering … entspringt das 
‘Warum?’. Nur weil das Warum als solches moglich 
ist, konner wir in bestimmter Weise nach Grunden 
fragen und begrunden” (1955, p. 41). 
 
Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology, Volume 5, Edition 2 December 2005  Page 3 of 10 
 
 
The IPJP is a joint project of Rhodes University in South Africa and Edith Cowan University in Australia. This document is subject to 
copyright and may not be reproduced in whole or in part via any medium (print, electronic or otherwise) without the express permission of the 
publishers. 
The Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology (IPJP) can be found at www.ipjp.org. 
In the Essay, the crucial issue is to be able to embrace 
the nothingness of anxiety and strangeness. For 
Heidegger, the key to understanding this form of 
staying in the anxiety and strangeness is resolve 
(entschlossenheit). Resolve is, as Hubert Dreyfus 
maintains, the power of Dasein to stay in its 
powerlessness - rather than attempting to will itself 
out of its powerlessness or state of being struck dumb 
(1993, p. 319).  It is as Dasein stays with its anxiety 
that what-is dawns upon it: “There where the danger 
is apprehended as the danger so the saving power 
grows”. Heidegger is fond of quoting Holderlin. In 
this context, to be consistent with his philosophy, 
Heidegger ought to have encouraged the German 
people to dwell in their anxiety - in their danger and 
in the lostness of their will, so that they could 
apprehend themselves as living in the “danger” and 
“anxiety” of a lost will. For only as they dwell in and 
embrace the anxiety of their lostness do they prepare 
themselves for an attunement to their own 
situatedness, and it is only in their embracing of their 
own situatedness that what-is opens up to dawn on 
them. However, the more they will their attunement 
to what-is, the more what-is recedes into the 
background. And the more Heidegger can only call 
for a holding onto an image of an attunement to what 
is.  
 
Like a psychotherapist, Heidegger needed to provide 
a “holding environment” through which the German 
people could stay with their danger and allow the 
saving power to grow by being attuned to the danger 
as the danger. But Heidegger failed in this regard. He 
attempted to will them out of their danger and, in so 
doing, confused the mirrored image of philosophy 
with the “authentic” activity of philosophising.  
 
The exposition that follows is divided into two 
sections. In the first section, I shall compare the 
relationship between Dasein and what-is in the two 
texts, showing that in the Essay an “attunement” to 
what-is “dawns” on Dasein, while in the Address the 
German is called upon to will” an “attunement” to 
what-is. In the second section, I shall demonstrate that 
the form of “attunement” in the Address is not an 
“attunement” to what-is, but is a wilful - a narcissistic 
and nationalist - “attunement” to an “attunement” to 
what-is. 
 
Resoluteness   
 
The notion of a resolute will (entschlossenheit) is 
central to the Address. This Address is a call by 
Heidegger to the German people to will themselves. 
The demand to will themselves is expressed on a 
number of dimensions. It is expressed quite explicitly 
when Heidegger says that the destiny of the German 
people depends on the extent to which “we, as a 
historical-spiritual people, still and once again will 
ourselves” (1985, p. 480). To “will ourselves” means 
that we will “that our people fulfil its historical 
mission” (ibid.). To will its mission is also to will its 
“essence” (1985, p. 471).  Will to essence is also a 
will to science, for science, Heidegger believes, 
defines the essence of the German people. By willing 
their essence as science, Heidegger believes that the 
German people will be fulfilling their historical 
mission.  
 
In what follows, I shall demonstrate that Heidegger’s 
notion of resoluteness (entschlossenheit - as the 
dwelling in uncertainty necessary for questioning) in 
the Address does not meet the conditions of 
“entschlossenheit” or resoluteness as set out in his 
philosophical texts. I shall demonstrate that, in spite 
of the fact that, in the Address, Heidegger writes of 
the nihilism of the death of God, the level of anxiety 
which underpins resoluteness is not reached in the 
Address, and, therefore, the condition of fundamental 
questioning, of a questioning of “what-is” does not in 
fact take place in the Address. This will allow me to 
suggest that Heidegger’s concept of the will or desire 
of the Germans for themselves is not a resolute but a 
pre-resolute, nationalist desire. For, as I will show, it 
is not a resolute desire that emerges out of anxiety, 
but is something that is artificially imposed on 
anxiety, or, as it is named in the Address, the death of 
God. 
 
As outlined in the Essay, dawning is the condition of 
an attunement to what-is. Dawning of what-is is 
possible only when, through anxiety, the human being 
loses all sense of its identity and being at home in the 
world. Only when the human being has nothing, no 
one and no category of being upon which to rely, is it 
thrown into this reflexive mode of attunement. As 
long as the human being has a sense of who it is, it 
cannot articulate the question of what-is. As 
Heidegger puts it: “Dread holds us in suspense 
because it makes what-is in totality slip away from us. 
Hence we too, as existents in the midst of what-is, 
slip away from ourselves along with it. For this 
reason it is not ‘you’ or ‘I’ that has the uncanny 
feeling, but ‘one’. In the trepidation of this suspense 
where there is nothing to hold on to, pure Da-sein is 
all that remains” (1948, p. 336). 
 
What is noteworthy in this quotation is that when 
dread - or, as Heidegger calls it in Being and Time, 
anxiety - forms the basis of questioning, “we too ... 
slip away from ourselves”. This means that we have 
no sense of a particular self at all. It is “one” - Da-
sein or being there - and not “you” or “I” that is left 
after such an experience. This suggests that in dread - 
or, as I have throughout this text called it, anxiety - 
there is no sense of personal, geographical and thus 
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national identity that can be affirmed. There is no 
sense of the familiar through which to make sense of 
our being-in-the-world. We do not confront ourselves 
as either individuals or people of particular cultures or 
nations - all these dimensions are deprived of 
meaning. And it is only when they are deprived of 
meaning that we become attuned to what-is as such. 
We come to question what-is when all our sense of 
self and the familiar has been undermined. 
 
It is the notion of a particular familiar self that is not 
undermined in the Address: the “German” as a 
political, geographical and personal identity is not 
undermined by the nihilism experienced in the “death 
of God”. In the Address, it seems that the death of 
God gives rise not to “one” or pure “Da-sein”, but to 
the notion of the “German” (1985, pp. 474), which is 
a particular form of Dasein. In the Address, 
Heidegger implies that what survives and is affirmed 
in the experience of the death of God, what survives 
the advent of nihilism, is the notion of “German-
ness”.  For, where in the face of nihilism God loses 
all meaning, the category “German” is still a 
meaningful category. The “Germans”, more powerful 
than God in their ability to withstand nihilism, are 
going to enable the world to survive in the face of the 
death of God. In the Address it is a particular national 
you or I that finds itself attuned to the question of 
what-is. 
 
Even for Holderlin - Heidegger’s hero - the event of 
the death of God left only the categories of time and 
space rather than specific objects or categories within 
space and time as themes of concern: “At such a 
moment, the man forgets himself and the God, and 
turns around, admittedly in a holy way, like a traitor. 
At the extreme limit of suffering, nothing indeed 
remains but the conditions of time and space” 
(Lacoue Labarthe, 1989, p. 43). 
 
What Holderlin’s observation implies is that, when 
we forget God, we also forget “man” in all his 
determinations. Therefore the notion of “German-
ness” - amongst all categories within the world - is 
itself made insignificant in the face of the death of 
God, for this is a particular spacio-temporal category. 
For “German-ness” is a form of “Man”. There is no 
identity that survives nihilism. And it is only in the 
experience of the absence of worldly identity that we 
experience space and time. Or, in Heideggerian terms, 
it is only in the anxiety of no-thingness that we 
experience “what-is” as such. On Heidegger’s own 
terms, developed in Being and Time and in the Essay, 
to be in anxiety or to be placed in the “storm” (1985, 
p. 480), as Heidegger suggests the German is, would 
be to have no political or cultural “roof” over one’s 
head.  In such anxiety there is no “German” but only 
“one”.  
 
The Address gives every indication that the being of 
the German is not in question, but the taken for 
granted basis of all questioning. However, as Scott 
notes, Heidegger does question the average everyday 
ways of the German as a means of restoring it to its 
authenticity, but he does not question the notion of 
German-ness itself. This is a category that seems to 
survive all kinds of ruptures and alienations. The 
Germans must discover their true way and to this 
extent they must place themselves in question. That 
there is an essential German-ness is, however, not 
placed in question. Its integrity is assumed throughout 
the text. Again, Scott points out that Heidegger 
admits to not knowing the essence of the German, but 
he nevertheless unquestioningly believes that there is 
an essence that is German, that is beyond doubt 
(1990, pp.164-166), and that can be known; for, as 
Scott puts it, the university governs itself in terms of a 
German essence “they know they do not know”. The 
function of the German University is to retrieve the 
“essence that is lost to view” (1990, p.152). 
 
It therefore seems fair to say that, in the Address, 
questioning takes place not in the attunement of the 
“one” or “Da-sein” - as in the Essay - but in the 
context of the taken for grantedness of German-ness. 
The Germans are the horizon in which all questioning 
happens, but the being of the “German” is not itself 
exposed to questioning. Yet, in the Essay, it is only 
when the category of the “German” - as all other 
onticities - is placed in question that the question of 
“what-is” can possibly be raised, for it is only as we 
let go of all everyday and ontic categories that we are 
able to be attuned to the question of being: only 
when, in the insignificance and rupture of meaning 
experienced in dread or anxiety, we are no longer 
“Jew” or “German” can we ask the question of what-
is. Only when all political, social, psychological and 
cultural categories have been ruptured, the question of 
what-is becomes a significant theme.  
 
It must therefore be maintained that, in terms of 
Heidegger’s philosophy as developed in the Essay, 
the German cannot be the condition of possibility of 
being attuned to what-is. For it is only in anxiety, 
when the category “German” has lost all meaning, 
that the possibility of being attuned to what is arises. 
From the Heideggerian perspective, resoluteness is 
possible only when the human being affirms that it 
has no identity, no-thing to hold onto; no home, no 
ideals, no ground. Exemplary of a resolute will is 
Heidegger’s concept of the figure of Socrates: “All 
through his life and right into his death, Socrates did 
nothing else than place himself into this draft, this 
current, and maintain himself in it. This is why he is 
the purest thinker of the West. This is why he wrote 
nothing” (1968, p. 17). 
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In terms of the notion of resoluteness, what needs to 
be highlighted in this latter quote is the fact that 
Socrates “maintained” or affirmed himself in the 
“draft”, in the homelessness and the unknown. He did 
not know where the draft would blow him, but he 
resolutely allowed himself to be carried by it. To be 
Socratic, as Heidegger quotes Hoelderlin, is to be “a 
sign that is not yet read,” a sign that does not know its 
destiny in advance, that does not know where it is 
headed but affirms the fact of not knowing where it is 
heading. In the Address, Heidegger maintains that the 
Germans, like Socrates, are themselves cast into a 
“storm” (1985, p. 480), but instead of resolutely 
affirming or maintaining themselves in the unknown 
direction in which the wind would blow, they are 
called upon to will the direction of the will in the 
name of science, themselves, their German-ness and 
their essence. They are called upon to will the end of 
the storm. Even though they are in a storm, they know 
the end to which they aspire. They want and will their 
German-ness. Rather than calling the Germans to will 
themselves, Heidegger, in line with the resoluteness 
required for deconstruction, ought to have called the 
German people to affirm their own homelessness and 
powerlessness. This affirmation of homelessness and 
powerlessness would be the grounds upon which an 
openness to what-is would “dawn” (1948, p. 347) and 
announce itself, for it is through the affirmation of 
homelessness that we are ready to articulate the 
existential questions being posed by such 
homelessness. 
 
The will of the Germans for themselves is not shown 
to be something that announces itself through 
resoluteness. This presencing of German-ness through 
rupture has not been demonstrated in the Address. If 
anything, as already shown, the death of God - the 
crisis articulated in the Address - gives rise to an 
attunement to “one” or Da-sein and not to German-
ness. Heidegger does not show how the death of God 
gives rise to the presence of the German to itself.  It 
seems that Heidegger, in the Address, has 
manipulated his perspective on nihilism and anxiety 
in favour of his conception of the German mission. 
This possibility is suggested by a point made by Hans 
Sluga, who believes that it was by imposing his 
theory of crisis as questioning on to the German that 
the German comes to be seen as that Being in terms 
of which the questioning of Being becomes possible. 
He maintains that the Heideggerian notion of crisis, in 
the context of the Address, was “not an empirical idea 
waiting for confirmation but a regulative ideal, an a 
priori that structured the perception of the world for 
those who were in its grip. It determined their 
philosophical thinking as well as their political 
involvement” (1993, p. 67). 
 
As an a priori, the language of crisis, the death of 
God, its meaning and significance, was imposed on 
the everyday reality of the German rather than being 
generated out of it. While there might be evidence 
that the Germans in the 1930s were in crisis, 
Heidegger does not supply any deconstructive 
evidence to suggest that the crisis experienced by the 
Germans was to do with the death of God and that the 
Germans qua Germans were most equipped to 
respond to this crisis. In fact, to reiterate a point 
already made, we can say that, if the crisis was to do 
with the death of God, then it was not specifically a 
crisis which could involve the German, but would 
involve humankind as a whole; for in such a crisis, 
not even the Germans as an historical identity could 
have a sense of themselves as Germans, a sense worth 
fighting for or preserving. But Heidegger does 
maintain that the Germans had a sense of mission, 
purpose and destiny as Germans, and yet they were in 
the grips of the death of God. 
 
The fact that Heidegger did not show that German-
ness announces itself through deconstruction suggests 
that the mode of reasoning in the Address cannot be 
characterised in the name of deconstruction. Indeed, 
as I have already claimed, most of the significant 
terms in the context of the address remain 
undeconstructed and are used in a way that 
presupposes that their common sense meaning is 
shared and self evident. This includes terms like 
“ourselves”, “essence”, “German-ness” and “spirit”. 
In the words of George Steiner, Heidegger’s language 
in the Address is “kitsch” (1996, p. xxvii). 
Translating this latter term into Heideggerian 
vocabulary, it is an “average everyday” (ab)use of his 
own language. If anything, the process of reasoning in 
the Address is an imitation of the process of 
deconstruction. It makes connections which appear to 
be deconstructive, but it does not demonstrate the 
actual steps of the deconstruction. 
 
In his later writings, Heidegger maintains that a 
people cannot find themselves and their home by 
striving after themselves. As he says: “The native or 
indigenous cannot be acquired through a compulsive 
and brutally coercive grasping of one’s own being  -  
as if the latter could be fixed like an empirical state of 
affairs.” T. S. Eliot amplifies Heidegger’s point in 
maintaining that culture cannot be willed: “Culture is 
the one thing that we cannot deliberately aim at. It is 
the product of a variety of more or less harmonious 
activities, each pursued for its own sake: the artist 
must concentrate upon his canvas, the poet upon his 
typewriter, the civil servant upon the just settlement 
of particular problems as they present themselves 
upon his desk, each according to the situation in 
which he finds himself” (Bantock, 1970, p. 62). 
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From a Heideggerian perspective, a culture, heritage, 
religion and average everyday intelligibility is not 
something that can be an object of my will because it 
defines the very conditions in which I will. It is not 
something for me, but something that I myself am 
“in”, something that defines the horizon in which I 
am attuned to the world. I cannot will the way in 
which my will is attuned or absorbed in the world. 
Heidegger expresses the impossibility of the mission 
of the will to will in the following way: “Inasmuch as 
the will wills the overpowering of itself, it is not 
satisfied with any abundance of life. It asserts power 
in overreaching - i.e., in the overreaching of its own 
will. In this way it continually comes as the selfsame 
back upon itself as the same” (1977, p. 81). 
 
We can also say that background familiarity, as well 
as our being shaped by the way we are involved in the 
world, are not the kinds of things that form the 
subject matter of the will. We cannot will the 
background of familiarity that we have with a place, 
because the background is not an explicit object in 
itself but emerges into being only through 
involvement and interaction. And, as has already been 
said, we cannot will how our identity is going to 
emerge out of our interactions within an environment, 
for it does not emerge in terms of a blue print; rather, 
we discover who we are only through the interactions 
in which we have been involved. 
 
It is this understanding that is absent in the Address. 
Here Heidegger calls upon the German, alienated 
from its mission, to will its own being, to will to be 
involved in the question of what-is and thus to will its 
own will and way of being involved in the world, 
which according to Heidegger is a will to oneness-to-
what-is. In the Address, the German is not retrieving 
its essence, its spirit, and its mission, but is called 
upon to will itself to engage in these activities. In 
Heidegger’s own terms, however, this is not 
something that can be willed, but a concern that arises 
through the resolute acceptance of anxiety. In his later 
writings, Heidegger will admit the logic of this 
mistake when he says that the nation can “never be 
the goal and purpose” of itself. A comment by Martin 
Buber in this regard is apt: “[No] nation in the world 
has this [self-preservation and self assertion] as its 
only task, for just as an individual who wishes to 
preserve and assert himself leads an unjustified and 
meaningless existence, so a nation with no other aim 
deserves to pass away” (1963). 
 
As Guignon points out, by 1936 Heidegger 
acknowledges that the Volk can “never be the goal 
and purpose” of itself and that the endeavour to see 
the Volk in such a way is a function of “me-centred” 
thinking (1993, p. 34).  A nation that constitutes itself 
as its only task is a nation that wills its own will (for 
all tasks involve an activity of willing). This point 
was never foreign to Heidegger the philosopher, who, 
even in Being and Time, believed that the self does 
not constitute itself by striving after itself, but by 
turning away from itself. 
 
In the next part of this paper, I wish to develop the 
hermeneutic phenomenological form of such “me-
centred” thinking, of a thinking which makes itself its 
own goal and purpose. I will focus on the central role 
played by the will in the Address. I shall deconstruct 
the will in terms of Heidegger’s hermeneutic 
phenomenology as set out in Being and Time, 
demonstrating that it may be thought of not as an 
attunement to what-is but as an attunement to an 
attunement to what-is. 
 
Narcissistic and Nationalistic Attunement to 
Attunement 
 
The subject matter of the will in the Address - 
“essence”, “ourselves”, “spirit”, “mission” and 
“science” - remains undeconstructed.  The notion 
“ourselves” does not have the ontological status of 
entities present-at-hand or objects of equipment 
ready-to-hand.  An “essence” is not like a hammer or 
a chemical structure. We do not know what it means 
to “will” “ourselves”. What practices are we involved 
in when we are said to be “willing” “ourselves”?  We 
know what it means to manipulate and use a hammer, 
but what does it mean to be involved in ourselves?  In 
the context of the Address, the form of practices 
corresponding to the notion of willing ourselves 
remains unclear. We do not know the ontological 
status of the notions of the “German”, “mission”, 
“spirit”. Even the term “will” remains 
undeconstructed in the Address. There is no outline of 
the logic of willing in the Address.   
 
In order to clarify the meaning of the practices 
corresponding to the notion of “willing ourselves”, I 
wish to deconstruct the language of the Address in 
terms of the language of Being and Time. For in 
Being and Time Heidegger maintains that the 
language of the will is not an ontologically primordial 
language, but a language which needs to be 
deconstructed in terms of the language of Dasein’s 
way of caring and concern. For the Heidegger of 
Being and Time, to will something is to care for or be 
involved in it: “Willing and wishing are rooted with 
ontological necessity in Dasein as care. … [Care] 
implies ontologically a relation to entities within-the-
world. Care is always concern and solicitude” (1985a, 
p. 238).  For Heidegger, to care is to care for some 
thing or entity. It is to stand in relationship to 
something ready-to-hand or present-at-hand. It is to 
be attuned to an other. This means that to “will” is to 
be attuned to or involved in some being or entity: “If 
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willing is to be possible ontologically … the prior 
disclosedness … of something with which one can 
concern oneself (the world as the ‘wherein’ of being-
already)” (1985, pp. 238-239) must be given. 
 
It is as a form of the language of involvement as 
developed in Being and Time that I propose to 
analyse the language of the Address. The question 
that I propose to address is: how are we, in the 
hermeneutic phenomenological terms developed by 
Heidegger in Being and Time, to understand the call 
of the Germans to will themselves, and their essence?  
 
In the language of Being and Time the notion of 
“ourselves” is not an ontologically basic category but 
is deconstructable in terms of the notion of being-in-
the-world. For Heidegger, the notion of “ourselves”, 
understood ontologically, can never be an isolated 
subject that is independent of an objective world. 
“Ourselves” always presupposes and contains an 
irreducible relationship between Dasein and world. It 
is thus a form of relationship or of being involved 
with the world. This would mean that to will 
“ourselves” - the theme of the Address - is to will a 
particular form of relationship to or involvement in 
the world.  It is to will a particular form of attunement 
to the world.  
 
Next we need to unpack the notion of the “will” that 
wills “ourselves”. In the context of the language of 
Being and Time, “will” is not an ontologically basic 
category but always finds expression in a particular 
form of involvement. To will is to be “involved in”. It 
is to be concerned with or attuned to. This suggests 
that both the terms “will” and “ourselves” are forms 
of being attuned to or involved in the world. For, as 
already demonstrated, the notion of “ourselves” is an 
attunement or involvement in the world. Therefore, 
when we are concerned with willing ourselves, we are 
attuned to our way of being attuned to the world. 
Rather than the will being attuned to the ready-to-
hand, it is attuned to its own attunement to the ready-
to-hand. This is a form of attunement that does not 
occur to Dasein in its everyday state. For in its 
everyday state Dasein is absorbed in the world. This 
means that it is attuned to the ready-to-hand or even 
the present-at-hand, but not to its ways of being 
attuned to the ready-to- and present-at-hand. Being 
involved in or attuned to “ourselves” needs to be 
contrasted with being involved in something ready-to-
hand. Being involved in ourselves means being 
involved in our attunement or involvement in the 
ready-to-hand. We are thus not concerned with the 
ready-to-hand itself, but with the relationship that we 
have to the ready-to-hand. 
 
The same analysis seems to apply to all of the terms 
which constitute the subject matter of the Address; 
the notion of the “German” refers to a particular way 
of being attuned to or involved in the world, for to be 
a “German” is to be involved in the world in 
particular kinds of ways. Therefore, to will the 
German is to be involved in or attuned to a particular 
form of involvement or attunement to the world. For 
the German to will itself as German is to will a 
particular attunement to the world, and thus to will a 
certain mood, a certain way of caring and seeing and 
experiencing. Similarly, for the German to will its 
“mission” is to will its way of being involved in the 
world, for in hermeneutic terms a “mission” is a way 
of being involved in the world. It is important to note 
that willing is not the only, but a particular, form of 
being attuned to attunement. It is a territorial or 
possessive relationship to attunement; a possessive 
relationship to “our” way of doing things. 
 
Heidegger speaks about the German people’s will to 
“be a spiritual people” (1985, p. 476). This is a people 
with a particular care for being-in-the-world, and thus 
to will itself as a spiritual people is to will a way of 
caring. To will a particular way of caring is to be 
attuned to a particular way of being attuned to the 
world. Heidegger also speaks about the willing of the 
essence of science and the essence of the German 
way of being. The word essence in Heideggerian 
terms often refers not to an item of equipment or 
object present-at-hand, but to a particular relationship 
or attunement between being and world, and thus to 
will an essence is to will a particular form of 
relationship to the world. It is to be attuned to a 
particular form of attunement. Similarly, to will the 
essence of science is to will a way of relating to the 
world, for science is not a being in itself but a certain 
way of being attuned to the world. Therefore, to will 
science is to will a certain way of being attuned to the 
world which means to be attuned to a form of 
attunement. 
 
Put in more general terms, the focus of the Address is 
not “what-is” but a particular people’s relationship to 
“what-is”. Whereas the Essay is concerned with what-
is, the Address is concerned with the relationship of 
the German to what-is. To be concerned with the 
Volk or German-ness is, as Heidegger says, to be 
“me-centred”, and, as I am claiming, to be “me-
centred” means to be focused on the German’s 
relationship to what-is rather than being attuned to 
what-is itself. These are existentially different 
concerns. To will the German’s relationship to what-
is is to highlight not what-is as such but the 
relationship of the German to what-is. It is to focus on 
calling the German into a particular attunement; an 
attunement of wonder towards what-is. He who 
already wonders about what-is does not need to be 
manipulated in such a way. To be concerned with the 
question of what-is as such is to be absorbed by and 
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involved in what-is. To be concerned with the 
German’s concern with what-is is to be absorbed with 
the German’s absorption and involvement in what-is. 
In the first case, what-is is the theme of concern, 
while, in the second case, there is an existential 
distance and withdrawal from what-is in which the 
relationship to what-is becomes a theme to be willed. 
The Germans are called upon to will that their will is 
directed at what-is. They are called upon to will 
themselves to will a particular form of concern, 
namely a oneness to what-is. They are called upon to 
be attuned to their way of being attuned to the world.  
 
Yet, as already mentioned, in the Essay the will is 
struck dumb by anxiety in such a way that all willing 
fails: “All affirmation fails” (1948, p. 336) in the face 
of dread - even the self affirmation of the German 
people. If, as demonstrated in the previous section of 
this paper, the will in the Address is not a resolute 
will, then what kind of will is it? In Heidegger’s 
critique of Nietzsche he invites us to consider the 
possibility of a will that wills itself: “What the will 
wills it does not merely strive after as something it 
does not have. What the will wills it has already. For 
the will wills its will. Its will is what it has willed. 
The will wills itself” (Heidegger, 1977, p. 77). On the 
basis of Heidegger’s analysis of Nietzsche, it seems 
fair to suggest that, in the Address, the kind of will 
that Heidegger is writing about is a will that wills 
itself. In his critique of Nietzsche, Heidegger goes a 
step further and suggests that one of the forms of a 
will that wills itself is a will to power, for power is 
nothing other than the power of the will. If this is the 
case, then it can be maintained that the Address is a 
call for Germans to will their own power. 
 
The difference between and attunement to what-is 
and a wilful attunement to an attunement to what-is is 
also the difference between Heidegger’s philosophy 
and his politics. To raise the question of what-is and 
the kind of people who stand in relationship to what-
is is to raise two different kinds of questions, each 
having their own form of attunement. The 
philosophical question is characterised by openness to 
what-is, whereas the nationalist response is 
characterised by a territorialization of openness to 
what-is. In the latter case, “openness-to-what-is” 
becomes the privilege of the German, and “openness-
to-what-is” becomes the object of the German will. 
Rather than being open to what-is, the nationalist 
wills openness-to-what-is. The nationalist logic is 
characterised by the demand that the German people 
will themselves to stand in relationship to what-is - 
that is, they must will their attunement to what-is. 
They, who are estranged from their mission (namely 
an attunement to what-is), must will the return of their 
mission. They must will themselves to will what-is. In 
the face of the rupture of everydayness, the 
philosophical attunement, rather than calling for a 
willing of an openness-to-being, resolutely allows 
itself to be deconstructed. It does not posit openness-
to-Being, as an object of will, for it accepts that its 
will is numbed and thus unable to posit anything as an 
object of will. The resolute being can affirm nothing 
other than its numbness. It cannot will that which will 
emerge out of its numbness. It cannot will that an 
openness-to-Being will emerge out of its paralysis. 
Such an openness to what-is emerges as a 
consequence of the affirmation of paralysis and not as 
an object of will. In Heideggerian terms, openness to 
“what-is” “dawns”(Heidegger, 1955, p. 347) and 
“forces itself” (Heidegger, 1955, p. 348) on the 
human being through its affirmation of paralysis. The 
distinction between philosophy and nationalism in 
Heidegger can be traced to a distinction between a 
resolute attunement and a will that wills its own way 




In conclusion, it can be said that a difference between 
Heidegger’s philosophy and his politics revolves 
around the different ways in which he employs the 
notion of resoluteness. His philosophy is 
characterised by a resolved deconstruction of “what-
is”, while his politics is characterised by a 
territorialization of “what-is”. In his philosophy, 
what-is is said to “dawn” on Dasein, while, in his 
politics, there is a willing of a relationship to what-is.  
 
Perhaps one of the limitations of Heidegger’s 
philosophy is that he fails to distinguish the 
conditions under which anxiety leads to an authentic 
questioning of what-is and an inauthentic endeavour 
to territorialize what-is. He acknowledges that anxiety 
is a frightening experience and that in the fright we 
either recoil from the terror or stand with firm resolve 
in the terror. The question is: what leads us in one or 
the other way? Heidegger does not answer or even 
address the question. Yet it is a crucial question. For, 
as any psychotherapist would know, anxiety does not 
lead inevitably to attunement either to self or to what-
is. In anxiety, Dasein can remain in a state of terror in 
which it is too anxious to be responsive to what-is as 
such. In principle, the psychotherapist provides a 
holding environment in which a client or patient can 
be secure enough to explore the anxiety of being. 
Heidegger does not open up the question of such a 
holding environment. It seems that such an 
environment is vital to moving from an anxiety of 
terror and terratorialisation to one of disclosure and 
dawning. Perhaps it is the case that Heidegger in his 
politics did not make this transition. Anxiety, far from 
being a dawning or disclosive experience, was an 
overwhelming experience which took on a 
persecutory form. Heidegger was emotionally 
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confused. I will let Herbert Marcuse have the last 
word when, in a letter to Heidegger after Auschwitz, 
he says: “The difficulty of the conversation seems to 
me rather to be explained by the fact that people in 
Germany were exposed to a total perversion of all 
concepts and feelings, something which very many 
accepted only too readily. Otherwise, it would be 
impossible to explain the fact that a man like yourself, 
who was capable of understanding western 
philosophy like no other, were able to see in Nazism 
‘a spiritual renewal of life in its entirety’, a 
‘redemption of occidental Dasein from the dangers of 
communism’ (which however is itself an essential 
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